MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS(4)    FreeBSD Kernel Interfaces Manual    MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS(4)

NAME
     mac_seeotheruids - simple policy controlling whether users see other
     users

SYNOPSIS
     To compile the policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your
     kernel configuration file:

           options MAC
           options MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS

     Alternately, to load the module at boot time, place the following line in
     your kernel configuration file:

           options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):

           mac_seeotheruids_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION
     The mac_seeotheruids policy module, when enabled, denies users to see
     processes or sockets owned by other users.

     To enable mac_seeotheruids, set the sysctl OID
     security.mac.seeotheruids.enabled to 1.  To permit superuser awareness of
     other credentials by virtue of privilege, set the sysctl OID
     security.mac.seeotheruids.suser_privileged to 1.

     To allow users to see processes and sockets owned by the same primary
     group, set the sysctl OID security.mac.seeotheruids.primarygroup_enabled
     to 1.

     To allow processes with a specific group ID to be exempt from the policy,
     set the sysctl OID security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid_enabled to 1,
     and security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid to the group ID to be exempted.

   Label Format
     No labels are defined for mac_seeotheruids.

SEE ALSO
     mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4),
     mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_partition(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_test(4),
     mac(9)

HISTORY
     The mac_seeotheruids policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was
     developed by the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS
     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network
     Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates
     Inc.  under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of
     the DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS
     While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of
     the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry
     point checks.  As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on,
     in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.

FreeBSD 13.1-RELEASE-p6          July 25, 2015         FreeBSD 13.1-RELEASE-p6