SETPROCTITLE(3) FreeBSD Library Functions Manual SETPROCTITLE(3)
NAME
setproctitle setproctitle_fast - set process title
SYNOPSIS
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
void
setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...);
void
setproctitle_fast(const char *fmt, ...);
DESCRIPTION
The setproctitle() library routine sets the process title that appears on
the ps(1) command. The setproctitle_fast() variant is optimized for high
frequency updates, but may make the ps(1) command slightly slower by not
updating the kernel cache of the program arguments.
The title is set from the executable's name, followed by the result of a
printf(3) style expansion of the arguments as specified by the fmt
argument. If the fmt argument begins with a "-" character, the
executable's name is skipped.
If fmt is NULL, the process title is restored.
EXAMPLES
To set the title on a daemon to indicate its activity:
setproctitle("talking to %s", inet_ntoa(addr));
SEE ALSO
ps(1), w(1), setprogname(3), kvm(3), kvm_getargv(3), printf(3)
STANDARDS
The setproctitle() function is implicitly non-standard. Other methods of
causing the ps(1) command line to change, including copying over the
argv[0] string are also implicitly non-portable. It is preferable to use
an operating system supplied setproctitle() if present.
Unfortunately, it is possible that there are other calling conventions to
other versions of setproctitle(), although none have been found by the
author as yet. This is believed to be the predominant convention.
It is thought that the implementation is compatible with other systems,
including NetBSD and BSD/OS.
HISTORY
The setproctitle() function first appeared in FreeBSD 2.2. The
setproctitle_fast() function first appeared in FreeBSD 12. Other
operating systems have similar functions.
AUTHORS
Peter Wemm <peter@FreeBSD.org> stole the idea from the Sendmail 8.7.3
source code by Eric Allman <eric@sendmail.org>.
BUGS
Never pass a string with user-supplied data as a format without using
`%s'. An attacker can put format specifiers in the string to mangle your
stack, leading to a possible security hole. This holds true even if the
string was built using a function like snprintf(), as the resulting
string may still contain user-supplied conversion specifiers for later
interpolation by setproctitle().
Always use the proper secure idiom:
setproctitle("%s", string);
FreeBSD 13.1-RELEASE-p6 November 13, 2020 FreeBSD 13.1-RELEASE-p6
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